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Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
vs.

BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, ET AL.,
Defendants and Appellants,
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Intervenor and Respondent.

Case No.
8457

J

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondent contends we failed to apprise the court of
the factual background of this case in our Statement of
Facts. Counsel state that the only facts involved are
found in Exhibit 2-I and proceed to set forth part of these
"facts". Counsel are, of course, entitled to criticize our
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presentation, but we suggest that we have presented the
background of this case in the only understandable way.
The "facts" of this case are admitted. Only questions
of law remain. Respondent in its voluminous pleading set
forth in considerable detail the actions that had been taken
by appellants with respect to expenditures, budgetary control, personnel and legal representation of the respondent,
State Board of Education. It was then alleged that appellants asserted they had authority to act in these ways and
would continue to so act. Finally, it was alleged the actions
taken and the authority asserted were unlawful. Appellants
in answer admitted all these allegations, except the last.
This left nothing at issue save questions of law. Far from
being academic issues, the questions raised are current,
fundamental and real controversies with potential consequences, both direct and indirect, of major significance to
the government of the State of Utah.
In considering Exhibit 2-I, it is well to keep in mind
that in addition to the hearsay and irrelevant statements
contained therein, it does not purport to cover all expenditures, work programs, appointments of personnel and use
of the services of the Attorney General by respondent during the period in question, nor does it purport to cover all
the situations during the period in question in which appellants have rejected requests made by respondent. At most
it is an accumulation of the major disputes between respondent and appellants in recent years.
But we are not concerned here whether Dr. Bateman
should receive $10,000.00 per year as fixed by the State
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Board of Education, $6,000.00 as approved by the Board
of Examiners, or $8,000.00 as determined by the legislature,
nor is there any issue raised as to whether the employees of
the State Board of Education should have received pay
increases in 1948, 1949 and 1950. It may be that these and
other decisions of appellants were not wise or even that
the decisions made were arbitrary or involved an abuse of
discretion. It may also be that the Board of Education has
been wasteful and extravagant or unreasonable in its demands. The questions before this court, however, are not
what requests to the appellants by respondents should have
been granted nor what actions by appellants should not
have been taken, but rather the questions are whether the
respondent is subject to any supervision of appellants with
respect to expenditures, budgetary control, personnel and
employment of counsel and if so the character and extent
of this supervision. In this reply brief we will not cover
the last question which we believe is adequately covered in
Point VII of our original brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE
ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION.
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POINT II
BY STATUTE THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

POINT III
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE BY STATUTE HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

POINT IV
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINTMENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

POINT V
THE BUDGET OFFICER UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNOR HAS AUTHORITY
TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK PROGRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE
ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION.
In our opening brief we contended that the Board of
Examiners ( 1) has constitutional authority which cannot
be diminished by the legislature to examine all claims
against the state except salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, (2) that a claim includes expenditures
of state officers and agencies including the respondent,
and (3) that the power to examine such expenditures comprehends the exercise of discretion to grant or deny them.
We have chosen to discuss only the first two points here
and refer the court to our original brief for a discussion of
the latter point.
A.

The Constitutional Authority of the Board of Examiners.

Respondent contends that the framers of our constitution d~d not intend to vest constitutional authority in the
Board of Examiners. They point to the constitutional debates, particularly the amendment made to Article VII,
Section 13, inserting the "until otherwise provided by law"
proviso at the beginning of the section. It is true, of course,
that the framers of the constitution must have intended
something by the addition of this proviso, but as we have
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pointed out in our brief, the most reasonable construction
of their intention is that they intended to affect only the
composition and powers of the Board of State Prison Commissioners or at most the composition as distinguished from
the powers of the Board of Examiners.
This is more than a technical interpretation. The
framers of our constitution, many of whom were leaders
of the bar and understood the importance of precision in
language, spent a full four days of convention sessions
revising and polishing the constitutional language and
punctuation to make it conform precisely to the intention
of the delegates. Surely, they would not have allowed such
an important matter to slip by unnoticed because their
"attention" was directed elsewhere (Respondent's Brief, p.
23).
No member of the constitutional convention objected to
the examination of claims against the state by a board of
examiners. Certain members objected that Sections 12
through 15 were "legislative" but it seems clear that this
objection related only to the membership of the various
boards created by these sections. When these objections
were made, the delineation of the powers of these boards
was expressly left to the Legislature with two exceptions:
the powers of the Board of Pardons and the powers of the
Board of Examiners. With these two exceptions, you will
note that the powers of these boards are "as may be provided by law". This was the wording before the "until
otherwise provided by law" clause was added at the beginning of each section and is the present wording of the
sections. When it adopted the "until otherwise provided by
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law" amendment, the convention had reference only to the
membership of these various boards. It may have been
felt that in the future it might not be feasible for the principal state officers enumerated to act as members of these
boards and thus left it open to the legislature to provide a
different membership. This in no way affects the powers
of the Board of Examiners and Board of Pardons established by the constitution and not subject to change "as
may be provided by law".
The framers' intention is clear when it is considered
that after the proviso was adopted, the following substitute
to Section 12 was offered but rejected (II Proceedings
Const. Conv. 1152) :
"The governor, secretary of state, and attorney
general shall constitute a board of pardons and shall
have power to grant [pardons, etc.] * * * subject to such regulations as may be provided by law."
Had this substitute carried, the powers of the Board of
Pardons could have been restricted and controlled by the
Legislature. That a substitute to the section as it now
stands was needed to accomplish this demonstrates. that
the "until otherwise provided by law" amendment was intended to affect only the membership not the powers of
the Board of Pardons and Board of Examiners.
It is argued further that the framers of our constitution, by enacting Article VII, Section 13, with similar or
identical language to constitutional provisions of other
states, adopted the judicial construction placed on such
other provisions in other states. This is sometimes used
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as an aid to construction, but it is far from conclusive. Its
value as an aid to construction is considerably diminished
where, as here, there is no evidence that the framers of our
constitution knew of or intended to adopt the judicial construction of other states.
But, these cases from other states are far from definitive. The old Nevada case of Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15,
stands only for the proposition that expense bills of the
legislature itself need not be passed upon by the Board of
Examiners. After much contradictory language and argument pro and con, the court stated at 5 Nev. 32 that legislative expenses already accrued were claims against the
state which must be passed on by the Board. The court
concluded that the failure so to do was only an irregularity;
and aided by contemporaneous administrative construction
exempting legislative expense bills from the action of the
Board and the presumption of constitutionality, the court
refused to hold the act in question unconstitutional. Statements therein that the Board has no constitutional powers
and that claims made by state agencies are not claims
against the state must be considered dicta disregarded by
the court in the later Hallock case, and thus no longer the
Ia w in Nevada.

Lewis vs. Doron, 5 Nev. 399, is not in point. The sole
question was whether the comptroller, as well as the Board
of Examiners, had discretionary authority to approve or
disapprove expenditures. Expressly stating that the Board
of Examiners' authority was not affected (the only question at issue in the case at bar), the court held that the
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comptroller also had discretionary authority in the matter
of claims against the state.
The California case of Board of Trustees vs. Kenfield,
55 California 488, does hold that claims by state agencies
are not within the jurisdiction of a statutory Board of
Examiners but the reasons for the creation of a statutory
board may well be very different from the reasons for the
creation of a constitutional board.
The reliance of respondent on the Idaho case of State

vs. State Board of Education, 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201,
is misplaced. As pointed out by this Court in University
of Utah vs. Board of Examiners, et al., 295 P. 2d 348, the
Idaho Board of Education, acting as regents, have more
than "general control and supervision of the Public School
System"-they have "the control and direction of all the
funds of, and appropriations to, the university".
Furthermore, this court in State vs. Edwards, 33 Utah
243, 93 P. 720, and Uintah State Bank vs. Ajax, 77 U. 455,
297 P. 434, has determined that the framers of our constitution intended to vest constitutional powers in the Board
of Examiners. As this Court stated in the Edwards case,
"The Auditor is bound by the constitutional provision. The
Legislature is so bound, and so are we". In the attempted
distinction of these cases, the respondent fails. We concede
that neither of these cases is specifically related to the
authority of the Board of Examiners over the respondent,
State Board of Education. That is this case. But we do
contend that the principles established by this Court in
those cases applies here. To say that the Court in those
cases was influenced by the statutes may be correct, yet
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that in no way diminishes the holding by the court that
the Board of Examiners is vested with constitutional powers nor can it make any difference whether the claim involved was subject to approval by a single official rather
than a multi-member board or agency. The principle is the
same in both instances. The fact that this court in the
Edwards and Ajax cases did not discuss all of the contentions here made by respondent does not diminish the authority of those cases for it may have been that these same
arguments were considered by the court and rejected without discussion as being without substance. Furthermore,
the principles established by these cases have been applied
in the operation of state government since they were decided and particularly during the last 15 years. (See Stipulation Exhibit "A", pp. 13-21, R. 43-51). To overturn
them now should not be lightly considered.
Respondent advances other arguments based on constitutional interpretation. It is first stated that the constitution must be construed as a whole, a principle we heartily
endorse. Next it is said that Article X, Section 8 vesting
"general control and supervision of the Public School System" in the respondent would be given no effect if our construction of Article VII, Section 13 is correct. On the
contrary, if respondent's construction of Article X, Section
8 is correct, the result would be to give no effect to the
powers vested in the Board of Examiners by Article VII,
Section 13. As this court has previously determined in the
other branch of this case, University of Utah vs. Board of
Examiners, et al., supra, the fran1ers of our constitution
intended the educational functions of our state government

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
to be subject to the same financial review as all other

functions of our state government. The court's opinion in
that case also referred to Article X, Section 7, which declares: "All public school funds shall be guaranteed by the
State against loss or diversion". This is a provision as
applicable to the State Board of Education as it is to the
University of Utah and is a provision which should be
given the same effect as to both.
By vesting constitutional powers to examine claims of
the State Board of Education in the Board of Examiners,
the authority granted to the State Board of Education to
supervise the schools is not diminished. The initiative at
all times is in the respondent. The Board of Examiners
only reviews that part of the functions of the respondent
concerned with expenditures. It has only a revisory power
and the initiation of all action must come from the respondent.
Again it is argued that the general authority of the
Board of Examiners is limited by the specific authority
vested by Article X, Section 8 in the State Board of Education. But is not the converse actually the case? The
State Board of Education deals with all matters relating to
the public school system. The Board of Examiners
deals only with financial matters and with respect to
the functions of the Board of Education deals only
with the financial aspects of the public school system
and only after action has been initiated by the State Board
of Education. Consideration must also be given to the fact
that the University of Utah, which also operates, in part,
under a specific constitutional provision, has been held by
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this court to be subject to the supervision of the Board of
Examiners.
Respondent attempts to avoid the effect of the Idaho
cases and practice by stating that the Idaho constitutional
provision relating to the Board of Examiners has been
amended twice and thus the former construction of the
provision has been impliedly adopted and approved. If that
is a valid argument, it applies in Utah for Article X, Section
8, was amended in 1950 after the Board of Examiners had
made many of the decisions to which respondent now objects (See Exhibit 2-I). Have not the voters of Utah also
approved the supervision by the Board of Examiners of
the financial policies of the respondent?

B.

A Claim Within the Meaning of Article VII, Section 13 Includes Expenditures of State Officers
and Agencies.

The above proposition cannot be seriously contested
by respondent. The court below so held and the case of
State vs. Edwards, supra, involving a mileage claim by a
state employee so held. See also State Board of Education
vs. Commission of Finance, 247 P. 2d 435. This court in
Uintah State Bank vs. Aiax, supra, defined a claim as a
demand for money "paid into the state treasury * * *
subject to appropriation by the Legislature, and [payable
only] by the state treasurer on warrant of the state auditor,"
a definition which certainly includes expenditures of state
funds by respondent.
Notwithstanding, respondent contends the 1896 legislature interpreted the constitution as not including expendi·
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tures of appropriated funds as claims. Sec. 18, Ch. 35,
Laws of 1896 provides as follows :
"The state auditor shall not draw his warrant
for any claim, unless it has been approved by the
Board, except for salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, or for monies expressly appropriated by statute."
This statute did not restrict the authority of the Board of
Examiners since it applied only to the duties of the state
auditor. Nor did it imply that the Board of Examiners had
no authority over claims for which an appropriation had
been made. Sec. 63-6-7, U. C. A. 1953, originally enacted
as a part of the same statute, declares this authority; the
Legislature would not have denied authority in the same
statute. If there is any implication from this section affecting the power of the Board of Examiners, it is the implication that claims previously passed by the Board of Examiners, approved by the Legislature and money expressly
appropriated therefor need not be again approved by the
Board before a warrant can be drawn. Beyond that, the
statute does not go. In any event, it is a fragile basis for
an argument in the light of the repeal of this statute and
the contrary interpretation by the Utah and Idaho courts.
Respondent further argues (Brief pp. 48-50) that our
contentions should not be accepted because there are other
adequate safeguards for the expenditure of public funds.
Whether the statutes and constitution referred to are adequate to safeguard state funds is a question of opinion and
policy which, we submit, is not a question before this court
nor can it properly be decided by this court. But the re-
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spondent misinterprets our contentions by supposing a
situation where payment has been made or services performed and then the claim is submitted to the Board of
Examiners. No such situation can arise because the examination by the Board occurs before payment has been made.
This error by respondent is perhaps understandable for
they have referred to statutes which, for the most part,
grant authority to take action or seek information only
after the expenditure has been made. The discovery of
extravagances or irregularities after the transaction is
complete is informative but seldom effective. There is a
great deal of truth and good common sense in the old
admonition against locking the barn door after the horse
is stolen.
POINT II
BY STATUTE THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
This point was covered in Point II of our opening
brief and reliance was placed on Sections 53-3-9, 63-6-7,
10 and 11, UCA 1953 and Section 12 of the Biennial Appropriations Acts.
With respect to Section 53-3-9, respondent contends
that it relates only to the "personal expenses" of the State
Superintendent of Public Instrucion and the members of
the State Board of Education. No authority is cited for this
proposition nor is any definition of "personal expenses"
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attempted. Does it mean the salary of the Superintendent?
This cannot be for his salary is specifically covered by the
last sentence of the section. It certainly does not mean the
living expenses of the Superintendent. The most reasonable
construction oi the section is that it requires review by the
State Board of Examiners of the expenditures of the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board
of Education with respect to their official functions and
the carrying out of their duties as prescribed by law. This
would include the operation of the Department of Public
Instruction and the payment of the employees thereof.

It is contended that Section 64-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, first
found in the Revised Statutes of 1898, relating to expenses
of state institutions, conflicts with Section 53-3-9. It is
our position that this statute must be read in connection
with 63-6-7, discussed below, requiring the Board of Examiners to examine all claims for which an appropriation has
been made.
Furthermore, Section 64-1-6 has been modified by
Section 67-4-4 which provides as follows:
"67-4-4. Preparation, issuance and drawing of
warrants-Return of redeemed warrants.-Wherever provision is made by any existing law that any
warrant or warrants upon the state treasurer, shall
be prepared, issued or drawn by the state auditor,
from and after the effective date of this act, such
provision shall be construed to mean that any such
warrant or warrants shall be prepared, issued or
drawn by the department of finance. The state
treasurer shall return the redeemed warrants to the
commission of finance."
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Thus, it is now provided that the Commission of Finance
rather than the auditor draws all warrants. Implicit in this
change, which was adopted by Chapter 14, Laws of 1943,
shortly after the initial adoption of the Finance Commission
Act, is the authority of the Commission of Finance, as agent
of the Board of Examiners or pursuant to Title 63, to approve or disapprove expenditures of the State Board of
Education.
Finally, respondent has not brought itself within the
scope of 64-1-6 as a state institution. An examination of
the various chapters of Title 64 shows that the only "state
institution" over which respondent has any authority is the
Schools for the Deaf and Blind. This has been the case
since 1898. The statutes dealing with the junior colleges,
vocational schools and general administration of the Department of Public Instruction have always been found
in Title 53 or its equivalent and cannot therefore be considered state institutions within the meaning of 64-1-6. .;1
With respect to Sections 63-6-7, 10 and 11, U. C. A.
1953, which you will recall were enacted in 1896, respondent has an elaborate analysis found on pages 51-57. We
are not here directly concerned with Section 63-6-10 relating
to claims, the settlement of which is provided for by law
for which no appropriation has been made nor are we
concerned with Section 63-6-11 relating to claims for which
no appropriation has been made where the settlement has
not been provided for by law. We are concerned with Section 63-6-7 which specifically applies to claims for which
an appropriation has been made. The two former sections
relate to the examination of miscellaneous tort and some-
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times contract claims which often arise in the operation
of state government. The latter section, however, although
including these miscellaneous claims, also covers claims
arising by state officers and agencies acting under appropriations made by the Legislature. The language is clearclaims for which an appropriation has been made~and, as
we have previously discussed, a claim is simply any demand
for money from the state treasury.
Of the statutes we have noted to support our argument,
the provisions of the biennial appropriations acts is perhaps the most important in so far as expenditures for
salaries is involved, yet respondent has made no answer
thereto. These sections specifically vest authority in the
Board of Examiners to approve or disapprove salary schedules. These provisions, together with the provision found
in recent appropriations acts. (Section 1 (b), Appropriations Act of 1953 and 1955; Chapter 136, Laws of 1953
and Chapter 164, Laws of 1955) condition the expenditure
of appropriations by all departments of the state on review
by the Board of Examiners. See also Sec. 8 of the same
acts relating specifically to travel expense.
The matters discussed under this point are, of course,
immaterial if our contentions under Point I of this and
our opening brief are sustained for the constitutional powers of the Board of Examiners would then justify the exercise of financial review, irrespective of statutory authorization.
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POINT III
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE BY STATUTE HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
The respondent has cited cases purporting to hold that
under similar statutes to the Utah statute state financial
agencies have been held to have no discretionary authority
to disapprove unwise or extravagant expenditures. For the
most part these cases involve constitutional or statutory
auditors or auditing agencies acting under laws which do
not allow the exercise of discretion. In our opening brief
we discussed the distinction between the powers of auditors
and the powers of a Board of Examiners or Finance Commission (see appellants' brief, pp. 21-22). It is almost
universally held and is the rule in this state that a state
auditor has only ministerial powers, State Board of Land
Commissioners vs. Ririe, 64 Utah 213, 190 P. 59, but the
Commission of Finance of Utah is specifically given authority to approve or disapprove proposed expenditures-a clear
grant of discretion.
Some of the cases cited by respondent are unquestionably contrary to the contentions of the appellants. We
respectfully suggest that these decisions are erroneous and
cannot be applied in Utah under the present Utah statutes
relating to the Commission of Finance. Particularly is this
true in view of the history and the purposes for the 1941
reorganization of state government. Governor Maw put
it quite succinctly in stating the purpose of the plan was
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to give Utah a single state government rather than government of a hundred separate units.
In accordance with that purpose, a bipartisan commission was established assisted by a part time advisory
council. Among other powers, it was given the duty to fix
salary schedules for all state officers and employees which
"shall in no case be exceeded without the express approval
of the commission of finance" (Sec. 63-2-13, U. C. A. 1953).
Concerning expenditures. other than salaries, the commission must "approve or disapprove all requisitions and proposed expenditures of the several departments" (Sec. 632-21, U. C. A. 1953). Other powers over purchasing, investments, insurance and the fixing of bonds were granted.
Consistent with the scope of the title of Ch. 10, Laws of
1941, 1st S. S., "An act relating to the financial activities of
the state and the administration thereof * * *," the
Commission of Finance is to exercise these powers with
respect to "all offices, boards, commissions, institutions,
arms and agencies of the state government of every name
or nature now in existence or that may be hereafter created * * * " For the first time, a unified comprehensive and well thought out plan of financial service for the
state was established. Income and outgo could he correlated.
Detailed information concerning state revenue and state
expenditures could be obtained for the use of the Legislature, the departments themselves and the public.
Such a plan was certain to create friction with the
departments. No administrator is happy to have his decisions questioned by another agency. Quite naturally he
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feels that he is the best one to make the final determination
as to whether a new position should be established, a particular expenditure made or a salary increased. The difficulty is that this administrator has no knowledge of the
total picture. He is concerned only with his department
and has no information or inclination to learn of the problems of other departments or of the financial condition of
state government as a whole. Here is where the Commission
of Finance fills the gap. With up-to-date information of
the fiscal activities of all state departments, it can control
state expenditures to assure the best use of state money.
As a supervisory agency, the Commission can view expenditures more objectively than the administrator who initiated
them.
These are some of the purposes for the establishment
of the Commission of Finance. lVIany arguments both pro
and con exist as to the desirability of such an agency, but
these must be left to the determination of the Legislature.
At present, the statutes grant the Commission of Finance
in unmistakable language authority to supervise the expenditures of all departments of the state including respondent and we ask this court to so declare.

POINT IV
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINTMENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
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Section 63-2-14, U. C. A. 1953, quoted in our opening
Jrief, is our authority for the above proposition. Responient contends, ( 1) that this statute has been repealed by
implication and (2) that the statute conflicts with the con~titutional powers of the State Board of Education.
Section 53-2-8, enacted as a part of Chapter 16, Laws
of 1951, 1st S. S., is relied upon in support of the first
point, particularly the general provision of that enactment
to the effect that all existing statutes inconsistent or in
conflict with the act are repealed. This clause, however,
adds nothing to the argument for it is apparent it only
states the common law result that a subsequent statute
repeals by implication a prior inconsistent statute. See
Batchelor vs. Palmer, (Wash.) 224 P. 685; State vs. Becker,
(Wash.) 234 P. 2d 897; Ex Parte McKelvey (Calif.) 64 P.
2d 1002; cf. Lagoon Jockey Club vs. Davis County, (Utah)
270 P. 543. The question then is whether 53-2-8 is inconsistent with and thus repeals 63-2-14 by implication.
It is an established rule of statutory construction that
repeals by implication are not favored and every reasonable
intendment is against a construction resulting in inconsistency and repeal. See 50 Am. Jur. 562-567, Statutes, Sees.
561-565 and the Washington and California cases cited
above. Ireland vs. Riley, 11 Cal. App. 2d 70, 52 P. 2d 1021,
cited in our opening brief at page 38, is directly in point.
There a statute authorized the Department of Finance to
approve or disapprove all contracts made by all state departments. A statute enacted subsequently, authorized the
Board of Equalization to contract for liquor stamps. De-
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partment of Finance approval of such a contract was held
necessary. In discussing the question of repeal by implication, the court stated:

"* * * the courts will not adjudge a statute
to have been repealed by implication unless a legislative intent to repeal or supersede the statute plainly and clearly appears * * * Also, the rules are
especially applicable where a repeal would lead to
absurd consequences, or where the statute is an important one relating to a governmental matter, and
a repeal would be destructive or injurious to the
public welfare, impair a settled prerogative of the
government or leave no law whatever on a subject
concerning which it is necessary that there be a
positive law of some sort."
There is no inconsistency between 53-2-8 and 63-2-14.
The former prescribes the agency to initiate, the latter the
agency to review. The State Board of Education must naturally be given the power to determine who shall be its
employees and we do not contend otherwise nor do we contend that the Commission of Finance pursuant to 63-2-14
can choose the particular employee to be hired or can reject
a particular employee for personal or political reasons. The
functions of the Commission under this statute are to
prevent the unnecessary proliferation of jobs by a particular agency and to more efficiently utilize the employees
already employed by that agency or by other departments
of the state. We can state it no better than the Arizona,
court in the case of Industrial Commi.ssion vs. Price, 37
Ariz. 245, 292 P. 1099, that the reviewing authority has ,
nothing to say as to who the employees shall be but much
to say "as" to their necessity.
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It is also contended that 63-2-14 is a general statute

whereas 53-2-8 is a specific statute and that the specific
controls and supersedes the general. This argument was
raised and rejected in Ireland vs. Riley, supra, and State
vs. Brotherhood of Rwy. Trainmen, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P.
2d 857. Concerning Article X, Section 8, and Article VII,
Section 13 of the constitution, respondent also makes this
argument (respondent's brief pp. 42-45). Our answer there
is the same as our answer here, namely that the more general provision is 53-2-8 and the more specific is 63-2-14.
Under 53-2-8 the Board of Education can examine the
qualifications of applicants for employment and determine
who is best fitted for the particular job they have in mind.
The Commission of Finance has none of these functions,
does not concern itself with the particular person involved
and only determines whether the job to be filled is necessary.
We have discussed in Point VI of our opening brief
the proposition that the Board of Education is not a fourth
branch of state government. It has no constitutionally
vested powers but operates only under powers granted by
the Legislature. Salt Lake City vs. Board of Education of
SaU Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654. We further pointed
out that even assuming a grant of constitutional power
to respondent to supervise the public school system, the
contentions here made by appellants do not conflict with
these supervisory powers. The initiative is always with the
respondent. The Commission of Finance can only review
and operate as a check on the unwise or unlawful exercise
of a limited aspect of the total functions performed by the
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respondent. These considerations apply with equal force
to Section 63-2-14.
POINT V
THE BUDGET OFFICER UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNOR HAS AUTHORITY
TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK PROGRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION.
That phase of financial review known as budgetary
control is the question involved here. We contend, in accordance with the applicable statute, Section 63-2-20, U.
C. A. 1953, the Governor assisted by the Budget Officer
has power to "revise, alter, decrease, or change" the
amounts requested by the Board of Education in their
yearly and quarterly work programs. Respondent would
limit this authority to a power to revise, etc., only when the
amounts requested exceeded the appropriations made by
the Legislature. It is claimed this construction is required
because otherwise the authority would be unconstitutional
as an extension of the veto power or as an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The statute is clear and requires no construction. The
allotments requested can be reduced or changed "if the
Governor deems necessary". The purposes for such a
method of financial review are several. Basic to the plan
is that both the department involved and the disbursing 1
agencies know with definiteness how much money is avail- I
able during the period in question and can plan accordingly.
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It tends to assure the availability of funds throughout the

biennium by preventing the expenditure of too much at
the beginning of the biennium with a resulting lack of
funds at the end of the two year period. Furthermore, it
gives a necessary flexibility to state financial operations
by allowing adjustments to be made during the appropriation period. These adjustments, of course, need not be
reductions for other funds may be made available over and
above appropriations which were not anticipated at the
time the appropriation was made. Furthermore, additional
programs and expenditures, sometimes of an emergency
nature, can be accommodated. The Legislature cannot, of
course, anticipate all eventualities which may occur during
the two-year period for which the appropriations. are made.
It must invest authority in some official or agency to assure
that the best use of state monies is achieved.
The argument that by 63-2-20, the Governor is given a
continuing veto power is a poor analogy. The veto power is
a constitutional power residing only in the Governor and
can be employed by him only under the constitutional limitations. The power of budgetary control is a statutory
power which, we submit, could be given to any official
designated by the Legislature. Certainly, if this same power
to revise, alter, decrease or change requested allotments was
vested by the Legislature in the Secretary of State, for
example, there could be no claim that this power is an
extension of the veto power. The power itself, not the person who exercises it, is the only matter to be considered
here.
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The analogy to the veto power is invalid for another
reason. Once a veto is made of an item of appropriation
or of any other act of the Legislature, the appropriation or
statute is obliterated. It can have no further force or effect
unless the Legislature votes to override. Budgetary control,
however, is not a final irrevocable action for 63-2-20 expressly provides the allotments made may be "subsequently
revised or changed by the governor". Furthermore, a work
program submitted by a department can be increased as
well as decreased within the limits of the appropriation and
other available funds. A veto, being irrevocable, can never
be "subsequently revised or changed" nor can an item of
appropriation be increased by independent action of the
Governor.
To the argument that this power is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, respondent cites the cases
of Young vs. Salt Lake City, 24 U. 321, 67 P. 1066; State
vs. Gross, 79 U. 559, 11 P. 2d 340; Revne vs. Trade Commission, 113 U. 155, 192 P. 2d 563. \Ve have no quarrel
with the principles of these cases but contend that none of
these principles have been violated by the authority granted
the Governor and budget officer under 63-2-20. These cases
are concededly not in point factually and it may be significant that respondent has failed to cite a later case which
is more factually analogous. In Johnson vs. Bankhead, 120
U. 71, 232 P. 2d 372, a statute authorized the County Commissioners to fix the salary for the County Attorney at
not to exceed a stated maximum. This Court held such
power not to be an unlawful delegation of legislative power
to the County Commissioners. Similarly, the Governor,
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~ided

by the budget officer, may "revise, alter, decrease or
requested allotments as he deems necessary, provided that the aggregate of such allotments shall not exceed
the stated maximum, namely, "the total appropriations or
other funds from any source whatsoever made available
to said department for the fiscal year in question".

~hange"

The most obvious answer to the contention that this
budgetary control power is an unlawful delegation is to
consider the situation if no such power existed. The appropriation "or so much thereof as may be necessary" (Section 14, Chapter 136, Laws of 1953; Section 14, Chapter
164, Laws of 1955) would be made directly to the respondent as it is now. The respondent, however, would not submit work programs to the Governor. It would decide how
much of the appropriation was needed for the two years
and proceed to spend it accordingly. Perchance, it might
decide to spend less than the full appropriation. This is a
power unquestionably held by all executive officers and
agencies. Yet, no one would suggest that the decision to
spend less was an unconstitutional action. Therefore, can
it be reasonably argued that the Legislature, by authorizing
the Governor as well as the respondent to share in the decision to spend less, was unlawfully delegating its legislative
power? Clearly the answer is "No". The respondent or
the Governor merely determine the fact that the respondent
at a particular time can perform its public functions without the expenditure of the full amount of appropriations
or other funds available for expenditure. This is not a
delegation of legislative power, but an exercise of inherent
executive power.
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With all deference to the Louisiana, Oklahoma anc
Montana cases cited by respondent, they are erroneous iiJ
their discussion of the constitutional questions. The respective courts failed to recognize the true nature of the
appropriations and of the budgetary control powers granted
and made the spurious analogy to the veto power discussed
above.
CONCLUSION
For the failure of the court below to recognize and
apply to respondent the internal system of checks and
bal~nces on the expenditure of state money and employment
of personnel provided for in our constitution and statutes,
the judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
H. R. WALDO, JR.,
Special Assistant
Attorney General,
Attorneys for AppeUantB.
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